ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.

quirements, and the illustrious life of the late Chief Justice,
ROGER BROOKE TANEY, deplore the decree, inevitable at his advanced age, which has removed him from his place of usefulness,
dignity, and honor here.
Resolved, That they will wear the usual badge of mourning
during the term.
Resolved, That the Chairman of this Committee move the
Court, at its meeting to-morrow, to direct these proceedings to
be entered on the minutes, and that a copy be transmitted to the
family of the deceased Chief Justice, with the respectful assurance of the sincere sympathy of the bar.
On the next day the lHon. Thomas Ewing submitted the foregoing
resolutions to the Court. They were read by James M. Carlisle,
Esq., and feelingly and appropriately replied to, on behalf of
the Court, by Mr. Justice Wayne.
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AcTIoN.

Nonsuit and Discontinuance-cond Action for same cause.-The
record of a court of general jurisdiction, showing a decision that the
plaintiff be nonsuitedand the action discontinued, establishes no bar to
a subsequent suit for the same cause of action: Audubon, Executrix,
&c., vs. Excelsior Ins. Co., 13 E. F. Smith.
The decision in the first
action having originally been that the complaint be dismissed, was amended, upon summary application by the
plaintiff, so as to provide for a nonsuit and discontinuance. The propriety or legality of such amendment is not reviewable upon an appeal
taken in the second action, and the amended judgment is the only evidence -receivable of the dispositioi of the former action: Id.
1 From Charles Allen, Esq.; to appear in VoL 8 of his Reports.
2 From Hon. 0. L. Barbour; to appear in Vol. 42 of his Reports.
3To appear in 18 E. P. Smith's Reports.
4 From R. E. Wright, Esq.; to appear in Vol. 11 of his Reports.
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AmENDMENT.
Change of Form of Action.-A judge has no power to grant an amendment of the complaint, at the trial, changing the action from one ex delicto to an action ex contractu: Whitcomb vs. .Hungerford,42 Barb.
A variance between the complaint and the proof, in such a case, is not
one which can be disregarded, or amended, under the code, but is a failure to prove the alleged cause of action, not in some particular only, but
in its entire scope and meaning: Id.
CHIECK.
Bond fidE older.-To pass the title to a check to a purchaser, so as
to place him in the position of a bond fide holder, and to relieve him
from the equities existing against the original holder, something more
should be required-of him than simply parting with money upon the
individual checks of the borrower, upon the faith of receiving the avails
of the check in question, when paid: Russell vs. Scudder, 42 Barb.
There should either be a delivery or some positive act, showing an
actual transfer of the check itself, or a parting with the right to dispose
of it: d.
It would be a dangerous position to hold, in reference to paper of that
character, that where the original holder kept the entire possession and
full control of the check, and gave other paper for moneys advanced,
the party making the advances occupies the position, and is entitled to
the protection, of a bona fide holder of negotiable paper: Ad.
COMMON CARRIER.

Liability of Shipper for Freight.-The shipper named in a bill of
lading is liable to the carrier for the freight, although he does not own
the goods, and the carrier has waived his lien thereon: Wooster and
others vs. Tarr and another, 8 Allen.
Liability for Acts of connecting Carriers.-Common carriers doiig
business between certain po.ints, and not undertaking personally for the
carriage of goods to any further points, but merely engaging to forward
them to their destination through the established lines of 'transportation
beyond, are not liable upon their receipt for a bill of goods "1for collection" from a-person beyond the termination of their route, in the absence
of any special contract creating an additional obligation for the failure
of other carriers, to whom in the ordinary course of their business the
bill was intrusted for collection, to pay over the amount received by them
upon the same: Lowell Wire Fence Gompany vs. Sargent and another,
8 Allen.
CONTRACT.

Specific Performance.-The defendants made an agreement with the
plaintiff by which they stipulated that on the payment by him of
$200,000, for a certain number of shares of the capital stock of a railway company, then belonging to them, new directors, to be nominated
by the plaintiff and his co-purchaser, H., should be substituted in the
place of all the other directors, except the plaintiff and H., who were
then directors. Hdd,that the contract was an attempt improperly to
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interfere with the rights of others, and was clearly contrary to public
policy: Fremont vs. ,Stone,42 Barb.
.eld, also, that if the subject-matter of the contract was of that species which would authorize a court of equity to interpose and decree a
specific performance, the object and nature of it would forbid any such
interposition : Id.
The plaintiff induced H., the trustee, who held the package containing the certificates of stock, &c., to d~posit it in a bank. H. at the same
time directed the cashier to deliver the package to the plaintiff on his
depositing the balance of the purchase-money to the credit of H. The
plaintiff accordingly paid thit sum to the bank, and received the package, without requiring the performance of the stipulation relative to the
change in the board of directors, or mentioning the subject. IHeld, that
even if the contract were such as a court of equity would compel the
parties specifically to perform, the circumstances of the case would debar
the plaintiff from any right to that relief; and that he could not now
prevent H. from receiving the purchase-money and remitting it to the
vendors of the stock: Id.
CORPORATION.

Payment of Corporate Debts by Stocekholder.-A payment of corporate debts by a stockholder in a foreign corporation will be deemed to
have been voluntary, in the absence of proof that he was legally liable
therefor: Eastman vs. Crosby, 8 Allen.
Right of Bondholder of Railroad Company to convert Bonds into
Stock.-Where, by the terms of a railroad bond, a period was fixed
within which it might be converted into stock at the option of the holder,
an agreement for the extension of the time of payment before maturity
of the bond does not extend the-right of conversion after the time
limited therefor: Muhlenberg vs. The Philadelphia and Reading Railroad Co., 11 Wright.
DAMAGES.

Where no averment of Special Damages.-In actions for the breach
of a contract, or in actions on an indemnity bond, if the plaintiff states
no special damages in his complaint, he is confined, in his recovery, to
such only as arise from the breach, and then only to such as are proximate, and are the fair, legal, and natural result of the act provided
against: Rallocek vs. Belcher, 42 Barb.
Measure of Damages in proceeding against Railroad Companies for
Land occupied and Injury done in construction of Road.-In assessing
the damages caused by the construction of a railroad through a farm, a
proper standard is the market value of the land taken : 'the jury may
also allow for the disadvantages resulting from the manner in which it
is cut. Evidence is also admissible as to what the property would have
sold for before and after the road was made and in successful operation:
and such difference in value is a measure of damages: The East Pennsylvania Railroad Company vs. Rottenstine, 11 Wright.
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DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.
Statute of Limitations.-An agreement by a creditor to extend the
right to redeem land which is mortgaged to him to secure his debt, and
not to foreclose the mortgage for a specified time, does not extend the
personal liability of his debtor beyond the time at which it would otherwise cease by the statute of limitations: Ball vs. Wyeth, 8 Allen.
Preferences by lnsolvents.-The mere circumstance that a merchant
makes a disposition of his property, when he becomes insolvent, and is
pressed by creditors, is no.conclusive proof that he intends to defraud
them: Loeschigh et al. vs. Bridge et al., 42 Barb.
The fact that creditors are delayed in the collection of their claims is
not of itself sufficient to set aside a sale of property, unless the sale is
accompanied by an intent to defraud: .d.
Where the sale is for the full value of the goods, and the proceeds of
it are appropriated to the payment of bonO fide debts, there should be
no presumption of fraud: Id.
DECEDENT'S ESTATE.

Ancillary Administration in another State.-If ancillary administra.
tion is taken out in another state upon the estate there of a deceased
citizen of Massachusetts, a judgment there rendered, establishing a
claim against the estate, is not binding here, and cannot be proved
against the estate here; nor can the creditor establish his claim here
against the executor, or against the legatees, to compel them to refund
money paid to them by the executor, after the expiration of the time
limited for the presentation of claims against executors, although the
judgment was rendered after the expiration of such time: Low vs.
Bartlett and others,8 Allen.
ELECTIONS.

Quo tarranto-Inspectorsof Elections-Evidence in contested Elections.-Upon the trial of a quo warranto to determine the title to an
office depending upon a general election, the question is who received
the most legal votes: The People ex rel. Smith et al. vs. Pease, 18 E.
P. Smith.
The inspectors of elections are not judicial, but administrative officers;
their decision is final only as to receiving or rejecting votes; but the
question whether a voter was or was not entitled to vote, is open to examination in subsequent proceedings upon any competent evidence: Id.
It seems that the inspectors have no authority to reject a vote except
in the special cases where it is expressly given by the statute, as when'
the voter refuses to take the oath, or to answer questions, stands convicted of crime, or has made a bet on the election: Id.
A voter called as a witness may be asked for whom he voted, and, if
he declines or is unable to state, circumstantial evidence may be used to
ascertain the fact, and he may be asked for whom he intended to vote,
as one of the circumstances bearing upon the question: Id.
For the purpose of showing that a person votea, the poll-list kept at
the election is admissible, though not signed by the inspectors or clerks,
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having no heading denoting its character, and never having been filed
in the town clerk's office: Id.
Where a voter is proved to have been alien born and there is primo
facie evidence that he had not become a citizen by naturalization or
otherwise, the burden of showing that he has become a citizen is cast
on the party desiring to retain the vote; and, in the absence of such
evidence, the vote is to be disallowed: .d.
But where the evidence is only that one had voted and was alien born,
the presumption is that he voted legally, and had qualified himself by
naturalization: Id.
EQUITY.

Title of Plainti to Relief.-f a bill in equity is brought in behalf of
the plaintiff and such others having a like interest as may come in to
prosecute the suit, and no others come in, the plaintiff, in-order to maintain his bill, must show that he is himself entitled to equitable relief:
Hubbell vs. Warren, 8 Allen.
ESTATE.

Restrictions on the Use of.-If no permanent restriction upon the use
of an estate is created by deed, a court of equity will not imply one
under an alleged independent agreement, unless such dgreement is clearly
established: Hubbell vs. Warren, 8 Allen.
A simple agreement between the owners of adjacent estates for the
erection of buildings thereon in a uniform manner, and at a certain distance from the street, does not by implication require that the buildings
shall thereafter remain in the same position or of the same size or shape
as when erected: Id.
If the owner of two adjacent lots of land conveys one of them subject
to a condition that the buildings to be erected thereon shall be set back
a certain distance from the street, and with a warranty that the premises
are free from all encumbrances made or suffered by him, a previous mutual oral agreement between the grantor and grantee that they will set
back the buildings to be erected by them a greater distance from the
street cannot be enforced by one of them in equity: Id.
ESTOPPr,.

Admissions.-Admissions of a party, whether of law or of fact, when
acted upon by others, are conclusive against the party making them, in
all cases between him and the person whose conduct he has thus influenced: Hawley vs. Griswold, 42 Barb.
A defendant will not be allowed to give evidence of a particular fact,
"where it appears, 1st. That he has made an admission which is clearly
,inconsistent with the evidence he proposes to give; 2d. That the plaintiff has acted upon the admission; and, 3d. That the plaintiff would be
injured by allowing the truth of the admission to be disproved: .d.
EVIDENCE.
Experts-Form of Question.-There is no established form for questions to experts in this commonwealth, and any question may be proper
which will elicit their opinions as to the matters of science or skill which
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are in controversy, and at the same time exclude their opinion as to the
effect of the evidence in establishing controverted facts: Hfunt vs. Gaslight Co., 8 Allen.
FRAUD.

False Assurances-Action vpon.-No action lies to charge a person
upon or by reason of false oral assurances concerning the credit and
ability of a corporation of which he was the treasurer, made in order to
induce the plaintiff to receive a note of the corporation, signed by him
as treasurer: Mc~inney vs. Whiting, 8 Allen.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.

Agency.--A married woman may act as the agent of her husband,
and such agency may be created either verbally or by writing. The
addition of a seal to the writing appointing her will not have the effect
to destroy the agency: Goodwin vs. Kely, 42 Barb.
INNKEEPERS.

Liabilityfor Goods destroyed by Fire.-The liability of aii innkeeper
is of the same stringent character as is that of a common carrier: that
is to say, both are deemed to be insurers of the property delivered to
them, with a consequent liability for loss and damage happening to it
while in their possession; except when such loss or damage is occasioned
by the act of God or the public enemy, or through the fault of the
owner: .Euettvs. Swt, 42 Barb.
Accordingly held that an innkeeper was liable for property of a guest,
destroyed byfire, while in a barn attached to the inn: Id.
INSURANCE.

Verbal Agreement-Evidence.-An application for the insurance
against fire of certain engravings, similar in all respects to others on
which the insurer had recently issued a policy to the same applicant,
was made on Saturday; the parties agreed verbally upon all the terms
of such insurance except the rate of premium; the previous insurance
was mentioned in the conversation, and the insurer promised to make
out a policy and send to the assured on the next Monday morning.
Held, that a jury might well find a present contract to insure at"the
former rate of premium, and to furnish the written evidence on Monfday,
which authorized a recovery for a loss happening on the intervening
Sunday: Audubon vs. Erxcelgior Ins. Co., 13 E. P. Smith.
Evidence that the insurers were unacquainted with the manner in
which the building was occupied where the insured property was located
is too remote to affect the question whether they made the contract, and
immaterial if they actually made it: Id.
In determining the question whether the insurer positively undertook
to insure, or stated that he would see about it, the jury are authorized
to consider the probability of the applicant's being satisfied with the
latter answer: Id.
LEASE.

Injuries through ordinary Wear or unavoidable Acdent.-If a lease
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of buildings contains a written clause providing that they "are to be
kept in repair and maintained in good condition by the lessee," and
printed clauses providing that at the end of the term the lessee will quit
and deliver up the premises "in as good order and condition (reasonable
use and wearing thereof, fire and other unavoidable casualties excepted),
as the same now are or may be put into" by the lessor, and that the lessee shall keep the buildings insured against loss by fire, in a specified
sum, payable to the lessor, the lessee is not liable to repair injuries
whidh o ccur through ordinary wear, or fire, or other unavoidable casualties: Ball vs. Wlyeth, 8 Allen.
LIMITATIONS.

Payment-Estoppel.---J.G. and S. G. being indebted to the plaintiff,
upon a note made by them jointly, rendered an account of wood delivered by them to the plaintiff, under certain contracts; and a settlement
being made between the plaintiff and S. G., a balanceof $260.46 was
found due from the plaintiff to J. G. and S. G. for wood, which amount
the plaintiff, with the consent of S. G., indorsed upon the note. J. G.,
previous to such settlement, had consented that whatever sum was due
to the plaintiff on the wood-contracts should be indorsed on the note;
and after the indorsement was made, he said it was all right. Eeld,
that the indorsement must be held to have been made by the direction
and with the consent of J. G., and was a payment by him, which prevented his interposing the defence of the Statute of Limitations: Eawley
vs. Griswold, 42 Barb.
MADAMUS.
Issue of Peremptory Writ.-Though the practice of issuing a peremptory mandamus in the first instance is not to be commended, it is within
the power of the court; and the objection, that an alternative writ
should have first issued, is not available on error: The People, ex rel.
Belden, vs. The Contracting Board, 13 E. P. Smith.
MORTGAGE.

To secure Liabilities without yecifying the Amount.-A mortgage,
duly recorded, is not void, as to purchasers or creditors, for uncertainty,
when, being conditioned to secure liabilities already incurred, it does not
specify the amount: Young's Adm'x., et al.. vs. Wilson et al., 13 E. P.
Smith.
Power of Sale.--A power of sale contained in a mortgage of real
estate may be executed after the mortgagor's death: Yarnum vs. .Meserve, 8 Allen.
Of Chattels-Delivery of Possession.-If property mortgaged is in
the possession of a third person, an immediate delivery is not necessary:
Goodwin vs. Kelly, 42 Barb.
Where the vendor was absent, and the property sold was in the wareroom formerly occupied by him and his partner B., but then occupied
by such partner only; and shortly after the execution of the bill of sale,
the purchaser demanded the goods of B., but upon his claiming commissions on the sale to the purchaser, before he would give up the pro.
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perty, and suggesting that there was a prospect of his selling a portion
of it, the property was left with him; Beld, that the above rule was
applicable so the case: Id.
Where G., upon obtaining $200 from the plaintiff, told him she would
return it if she could; or, if not, that she would sell certain property to
him for $1000, if he could make an arrangement; Held, that it was a
question for the jury to determine, whether this was a mere mortgage
or an absolute sale, under proper directions from the court: Id.
Jzzdgment on Scire Faciassur Mortgage-.Validite of as againstTerre
Tenant with Notice to Defend.-A purchaser of mortgaged premises, who
has as terre tenant an opportunity to defend in an action upon the mortgage, cannot, after verdict and judgment, deny that the amount thus
fixed is due upon it; nor can his mortgagees, after verdict and before
final judgment on the first mortgage, do so either: Schnepf's Appeal,
11 Wright.
NEGUAGENCE.

Defective Eighway.-A person who, while using a highway simply for
the purpose of play, meets with a personal injury by reason of a defect
therein, cannot maintain an action to recover damages therefor against'
the city or town which is bound to keep the same in repair: Blodgett vs.
Boston, 8 Allen.
Riding on Platform of Car.-The court cannot say, on a bill of exceptions, that riding upon the outside platform of a horse railroad car is
such a want of ordinary care as to prevent a recovery for an injury sustained by being thrown therefrom: .Meesel vs. L. & B. R. R. Co., 8
Allen.
Evidence in Action for Escape of Gas.-In an action against a gaslight company to recover damages for an injury to the plaintiffs' health
caused by an escape of gas from a main pipe in a public street, from
which it passed through various sewers and drains into the cellar of the
house and thence into the house occupied by the plaintiff, evidence is
competent to show that all the other persons living in the same house,
who had been in good health before the time complained of, afterwards
became ill, for the purpose of showing the effect of the gas upon others
who inhaled it at the same time with the plaintiff; and it is immaterial
whether the injury was caused by inhaling gas of the defendants, or
other gases from the sewers and drains which it set in motion, provided
the plaintiff was not guilty of negligence, and the defendants were guilty
6f negligence: Eunt vs. Lowell Gas Light Co., 8 Allen.
]PRACTICE.
Judge's Charge-New Trials.-The commentaries of a judge, at the
circuit, upon the evidence, are not the subject of exception. If he
inadvertently misstates the facts, the counsel should correct him at the
time. If he expresses an opinion upon the evidence, it cannot be
reviewed on exceptions: Powell vs. Jones, 42 Barb.
Although it is the duty of a judge in charging a jury, to present
fairly both sides of the case, yet his omission to refer to a particular
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portion of the testimony which is deemed material on the one side, without his attention being directed to it especially, is not a good ground for
a new trial, it seems: Id.
What is Cumulative Evidence.-It seems that entirely new and positive testimony, seeking to contradict testimony given on the trial, and to
show that it was untrue, cannot be deemed cumulative: Id.
The rule in regard to cumulative evidence was adopted for the purpose of making parties vigilant in preparing their cases, and no diligence could guard against evidence which the defendant alleges is false:
-1d.
Where the newly-discovered evidence, as disclosed by the affidavits,
is so conflicting that it probably would not produce a different verdict, a
new trial would be of no avail; and the court should not disturb a verdict to give a party an opportunity to introduce testimony which would
not be of any advantage to him, nor tend to promote the ends of justice: Id.
PROM~sISSORY NOTE.

Aleraton.-The holders of a promissory note, without the knowledge
or consent of the indorser, procured a third person to subscribe it for
the purpose of adding to their security. The subscription was the same
in form as if he had been an original maker. This is not such an alteration as to vitiate the note or discharge the indorser: McCaughey et al.
vs. Smith et al., 13 E. P. Smith.
. Bondfide Eolder.-Where a promissory note, payable on demand with
interest, was transferred to the plaintiff, a bond fide holder, nearly three
months after its date: Held, that it was not to be deemed dishonored at
the time of the transfer, so as to let in a defence existing in favor of the
maker against the payee: Berrick vs. Woolverton, 42 Barb.
Such a note is a continuing security, and is not due without an actual,
demand; nor can it be treated as dishonored, until it has in fact been
presented and payment refused: .d.
A note payable on demand, with interest, is not due until demanded,
and hence cannot draw interest until that time, or until a suit is brought,
which the law regards as equivalent to a demand: Id..
REPLEVIN.

-

Liability of Sheriff where Sureties fail to justify.-The judgment
in replevin having been for daniages only, and not for the delivery of
the property, the sheriff is not liable for such damages by reason of the
failure to justify, of sureties who, on the arrest of the defendant in
replevin,. had given an undertaking for the delivery of the property if
adjudged, and for the payment of such sum as for any cause might be
recovered against such defendant: Gallarativs. Orser, 13 E. P. Smith.
To render him liable, there must be a judgment under the execution
on which the property might be sought and delivered: Id.
TROVER.

Agroeent.-To maintain an action for the conversion of property,
the plaintiff must show that he was entitled at least to the possession at
the time of the alleged conversion: Whitcomb vs. Hungerford, 42 Barb.
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A contract for the sale and purchase of a horse for $1000, one hundred dollars being paid down, and the balance to be paid in thirty days;
the amount paid down to be forfeited in case of default; is an executory
and not an executed contract. It does not transfer or convey the property and possession in preesenti, but the title remains in the vendor
until the price is paid: .d.
Even if such a contract were to be regarded as amounting to a conditional sale, it would not give the purchaser a right to maintain an action
for the conversion of the horse before he had complied with the conditions. Until that has been done, the title does not vest in him: Id.
VENDOR AND VENDEE.

Recovering back Money paid 'upon an .Agreement.-The law will not
allow a party, -who is wholly in default, to recover back money paid in
part performance of an executory agreement, if he afterwards breaks it
and refuses to go on and perform the residue: Haynes vs. Hart,42 Barb.
Where, upon the sale of a canal-boat, it was agreed that the purchaser
should have the use and possession of the 'boat -until default in making
payments, in which case the vendor might take possession of the boat,
and declare the contract void; and upon the default of the purchaser
the vendor did declare the contract void, and took possession of the
boat; Reld, that the purchaser could not recover back the payments he
had made: 1d.
Opinion of Witness as to alue-FormerSuit when a .Bar.-A mere
omission, by a vendor of chattels, to volunteer information, without
inquiry, of a difficulty known to him and unknown to the purchaser,
does not constitute fraud and entitle the purchaser to damages:
fcDonald vs. Christie,42 Barb.
The vendor has a perfect right to be silent, leaving the purchaser to
examine for himself or to require a warranty. And unless by words or
acts he leads him astray, he is not liable for fraud: Id.
In an action for fraud in the sale of a horse, a witness who swears to
his knowledge of the value of horses, from having kept them, and dealt
in them, for a number of years, and that he was acquainted with the
horse in question, is competent to give an opinion as to the value of the
horse: .d.
Where the purchaser of a chattel, in an action brought agans him
by the vendor, upon the mortgage given for the price, set up ai a defence the fraud of the vendor, upon the sale, but afterwards, and before
any adjudication thereon, withdrew the defence; fteld, that the suit
brought upon the note was not a bar to a subsequent action brought by
the purchaser, against the vendor, to recover damages for fraud on the
sale: .d.
A defendant may, in such a case, elect whether lie will recoup his
damages when sued upon the note, or bring his cross-action, and recover
in that for the alleged fraud : Id.
WILL.

Will made in New Jersey- VIalidity of to pass Ground-Rents in
Pennsylvunia.-Where a married woman in execution of a power vested
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in her by a deed of trust, made in contemplation of marriage, comprising personal estate only, made her will in another state, but in the form
required by the laws of Pennsylvania to pass her separate property,
giving and bequeathing her "residuary estate" to legatees named "share
and share alike, their heirs and assigns for ever," Pennsylvania groundrents, acquired by her subsequent to the date of the will, pass thereby
to the legatees: Alexander vs. .Paxson et al., 11 Wright.
Nuncupative Will-How established.-A nuncupative will cannot be
established where neither the words nor their substance, as used by the
alleged testator, were committed to writing as proof of a bequest, or to
be preserved as such, by any one, and no proof was made of a request
by testator to bystanders to bear witness that the words used were his
will: Taylor's Appeal, 11 Wright.
A letter written by one person, announcing to another the death of
the alleged testator, and in a general way his disposition of his estate, is
not such evidence as will make out a nuncupative will, especially where
neither produced before the register's court, nor proven to have been
lost or destroyed; nor is a fragment of an unsigned letter, by the same
witness, written two days after the testator's death, sufficient where no
testamentary words were used, nor the disposition of his property set
forth, but only that he had left his property to his wife: Id.
Probate.-A testator commenced his will as follows: "1, A. B., being
about to go to Cuba, and knowing the danger of voyages, do make this
as my last will and testament, in manner and form following: First, if
by casualty or otherwise I should lose my life during this voyage, I give
and bequeath to my wife," &c.; and afterwards gave independent bequests, and spoke of the instrument as his last will and testament. He
made the voyage and returned in safety. Held, that the will should be
admitted to probate: Damon and another vs. Damon, 8 Allen.
Chargingof Legacy on Land.-L. S., by her will, bequeathed to the
plaintiffs, to be received by them and to be appropriated to the forwarding of the gospel, the sum of $500, and to her brothers and sisters
share and share alike, the balance of her estate to be divided equally
between them; which several legacies or sums of money she ordered
and directed to be paid to the several legatees within one year after her
decease. After the will was admitted to probate, the assets received
being insufficient to pay the debts of the testatrix, the real estate was
sold, by order of the surrogate, and after payment of debts and expenses,
the sum of $729.66 remained on hand. Held, that the testatrix
intended to charge her real estate with the payment of the legacy of
$500 bequeathed to the plaintiffs; and the amount of such legacy, with
interest and costs, was ordered to be paid out of the fund in the hands
of the surrogate: The Roman Catholic German Church of the Holy
Uross of Albany vs. Wachter et al., 42 Barb.

